全國(guó)人事部一級(jí)筆譯兩年真題

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1、2015年CATTI一級(jí)筆譯英譯漢試題 原文： Conventional business wisdom is big on perfection. We are constantly exhorted to give 100 per cent – or even a mathematically impossible 110 per cent. But is this really the absolute virtue it is held up to be? Or is there a case to be made for doing a “good enough” job mos

2、t of the time? There are two well-known rules that suggest the latter is valid. The first is the Pareto Principle (or the 80-20 rule), which states that 80 per cent of consequences stem from 20 per cent of causes. The second is the law of diminishing returns, which suggests that, as you near 100 pe

3、r cent, you expend proportionally more effort on the remaining work. Graham Allcott, author of How to be a Productivity Ninja, says that people often look at tasks the wrong way – they focus on the detail of what they are doing, rather than the impact it has. “It is actually far more practical to

4、 think in terms of the 80-20 rule and focus ruthlessly on doing things that have the greatest impact.” He also recommends that you delegate the mundane parts of tasks that anyone can do. However, many people find this difficult because they are wedded to the idea of delivering their very best. A

5、s business psychologist Karen Moloney says: “Perfection is how they define themselves and to let anything out of their hands that isn’t 100 per cent goes against their sense of professional pride.” She says the trick is to remember it is about delivering what the business needs, not what you want to

6、 give. People who are natural perfectionists tend to see not giving 100 per cent as a failing. But you can reframe this by telling yourself that knowing which tasks do not need 100 per cent demonstrates good judgment. Holding on to a task or project by forever adding that extra 1 per cent can

7、sometimes be driven by a fear of being judged on the end result. It is therefore worth reminding yourself of the Steve Jobs quote: “Real artists ship.” One way to avoid running up against the law of diminishing returns is to set yourself deadlines. But rather than set fake deadlines that you know

8、 can be moved, Mr Allcott recommends making yourself accountable to someone else. That way, you will shift from “I could deliver any time next week” to “I’ll look bad in front of my boss if I don’t deliver by Tuesday”. Perhaps the most difficult thing to deal with, however, is not your own desire

9、 to give 100 per cent but your boss’s desire to see you give 100 per cent . Again, says Ms Moloney, you need to make it about what you deliver: “Explain to your boss you can accomplish far more if you don’t dot every I and cross every T.” However, some managers’ perfectionism is such that this appe

10、al to reason will not wash. In this case, Mr Allcott advises a more tactical approach: “Separate tasks into the more visual, obvious things and those that are under the radar that your boss will miss.” 譯文： 在工作中，人們通常認(rèn)為，追求完美是項(xiàng)美德。我們常常被鼓勵(lì)做到100%完美，甚至110%完美——哪怕這在數(shù)學(xué)上是不可能的。但追求完美真的像人們所說(shuō)的那樣，是絕對(duì)的美德嗎？抑或，我們有理由

11、認(rèn)為，大多數(shù)時(shí)候只需要做到“足夠好”？ 有兩條著名的法則表明，后一種看法是合理的。第一條是“帕累托法則”（又名“二八法則”），該法則稱(chēng)，80%的結(jié)果取決于20%的原因。第二條是“收益遞減法則”，根據(jù)該法則，工作完成得越接近完美，為完成剩余工作所需付出的努力就越大。 《如何成為高效人士》(How to be a Productivity Ninja)一書(shū)作者格雷厄姆?奧爾科特(Graham Allcott)說(shuō)，人們看待工作的方式往往是錯(cuò)誤的，他們更關(guān)注于自己做的事情，而不是這些事情會(huì)產(chǎn)生什么影響。“事實(shí)上，更實(shí)用的方法是，用二八法則來(lái)思考問(wèn)題、集中精力去做那些能產(chǎn)生最大影響的事情?！? 他還

12、建議人們將工作中那些誰(shuí)都能做的部分分派下去。 然而，許多人覺(jué)得這很困難，因?yàn)榻怀鐾昝莱晒睦砟钤谒麄兊哪X海中根深蒂固。如商業(yè)心理學(xué)家卡倫?莫洛尼(Karen Moloney)所說(shuō)：“完美是他們對(duì)自己的要求，讓不完美的東西從自己手中出去，有損他們的職業(yè)自豪感。”她說(shuō)，訣竅在于，要記住，關(guān)鍵是交出符合工作需要的成果，而不是你想交出的成果。 天生的完美主義者往往認(rèn)為，交出不完美的成果就等于失敗。但你可以這樣想，知道哪項(xiàng)工作不需要做到完美，也證明了你的判斷力。 在任何工作或項(xiàng)目中始終追求更加完美，這或許是因?yàn)閾?dān)心最后的成果得到不好的評(píng)價(jià)。因此，你應(yīng)該用史蒂夫?喬布斯(Steve Jobs)的話(huà)提

13、醒自己：“真正的藝術(shù)家是能拿出作品的藝術(shù)家?！? 避免遭遇收益遞減法則的方法之一，是給自己設(shè)定截止時(shí)間。但奧爾科特認(rèn)為，與其設(shè)定你知道可以推后的偽截止時(shí)間，不如把問(wèn)責(zé)權(quán)交給別人。這樣一來(lái)，你就不能對(duì)自己說(shuō)，“我下周什么時(shí)候完成工作都行”，而要告訴自己，“如果到周二還完不成工作，我就沒(méi)臉見(jiàn)老板了”。 不過(guò)，或許最難對(duì)付的不是你自身追求完美的欲望，而是老板要你做到完美的欲望。同樣的，莫洛尼說(shuō)，你必須強(qiáng)調(diào)要關(guān)注于你能拿出的成果：“對(duì)老板說(shuō)，如果不要求在每一個(gè)細(xì)節(jié)上都做到盡善盡美，我完成的工作會(huì)比現(xiàn)在多得多?！? 然而，有些經(jīng)理人的完美主義過(guò)于嚴(yán)重，跟他們講道理已經(jīng)沒(méi)用了。在這種情況下，奧爾科特建議

14、采取一種更巧妙的方法：“把那些比較顯眼、容易引起注意的工作，跟老板注意不到的工作區(qū)分開(kāi)?！? 2012年CATTI一級(jí)筆譯英譯漢試題 原文： No one can lay claim to so much influence on the shaping of foreign policy over the past 50 years as Henry Kissinger. In and out of office, he has been intelligently ubiquitous. Almost two decades have passed since the publicat

15、ion of Diplomacy, a masterly study of the subject that will long endure as a bible for all who believe that nation states remain the principal building blocks in international politics, whatever the human aspirations towards international co-operation. Now, with On China, Kissinger has turned his

16、 mind to a subject on which he has a unique vantage point. Publishers must have drooled at the prospect of this guru from the last century writing about the rising global power of the present one, especially given his own role in helping to open it up to the world. For Henry Kissinger, ancient Chi

17、na was a subtle place. That in turn led to its special resonance in the present: “In no other country,” he writes, “is it conceivable that a modern leader would initiate a major national undertaking by invoking strategic principles from a millennium-old event,” as Mao often did in discussing policy

18、matters. And Mao “could confidently expect his colleagues to understand the significance of his allusions.” How could it not be so? For “Chinese language, culture, and political institutions were the hallmarks of civilization, such that even regional rivals and foreign conquerors adopted them to var

19、ying degrees as a sign of their own legitimacy.” “Strategic acumen” shaped China’s earliest international policies; and to support its central position it could call on a remarkable series of potential followers and aides. A good example was the Chinese scholar known in the West as Confucius, wh

20、o taught by citing examples to a small group of loyal and dedicated students. They reciprocated by drawing on their conversations for practical examples that could create a legacy on his behalf—forming a canon that Kissinger describes as “something akin to China’s Bible and its Constitution combined

21、.” Whereas in the Western world “balance-of-power diplomacy was less a choice than an inevitability,” and “no religion retained sufficient authority to sustain universality,” for China foreign contacts did not form “on the basis of equality.” Kissinger’s reflections about the Western and Chinese

22、 concepts of strategy lead him to posit a stark distinction, one in which “the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage,” while “the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces.” It is a good way for Kissinger to prepare the reader fo

23、r a dualistic approach to two vast philosophical and military traditions, which he begins by summarizing the key differences between the Chinese players of the board game weiqi (the Japanese go) and those favoring the contrasting game of chess. While chess is about the clash of forces, about “decisi

24、ve battle” and the goal of “total victory,” all of which depend on the full deployment of all the pieces of the board, weiqi is a game of relative gain, of long-range encirclement, which starts with an empty board and only ends when it “is filled by partially interlocking areas of strength.” Tea

25、chers and practitioners of grand strategy have studied these contrasts between the two for many centuries. The principles of weiqi are echoed in the haunting text known as The Art of War, by a certain Master Sun, writing around the same time as Confucius. Kissinger quotes Sun at some length, drawing

26、 especially on his insights into the concepts of “indirect attack” and “psychological combat.” 譯文： 過(guò)去50年間，在外交政策的形成方面影響最大者，莫過(guò)于亨利?基辛格(Henry Kissinger)。無(wú)論在朝還是在野，基辛格的身影無(wú)處不在，這當(dāng)屬明智。《大外交》(Diplomacy)一書(shū)出版至今，已近二十載。其中有一個(gè)觀(guān)點(diǎn)：無(wú)論人類(lèi)多么渴望國(guó)際合作，國(guó)家仍將是國(guó)際政治基石。在信奉這一觀(guān)點(diǎn)的人心目中，基辛格這本研究外交的經(jīng)典著作，堪稱(chēng)一部經(jīng)久不衰的“圣經(jīng)”。 如今，憑借《論中國(guó)》(On Ch

27、ina)一書(shū)，基辛格將思想轉(zhuǎn)向了另一個(gè)話(huà)題，在這個(gè)問(wèn)題上，他有著獨(dú)特的發(fā)言權(quán)?？梢钥隙ǎ瑥纳鲜兰o(jì)起，出版商們就在巴望著這位大師能寫(xiě)一寫(xiě)這個(gè)當(dāng)時(shí)已開(kāi)始崛起、如今還在繼續(xù)崛起的新興大國(guó)，特別是考慮到基辛格的特殊身份——他幫助世界打開(kāi)了中國(guó)的大門(mén)。 《論中國(guó)》一書(shū)的核心內(nèi)容，講述的是1972年美國(guó)總統(tǒng)理查德?尼克松(Richard Nixon)與基辛格（時(shí)任美國(guó)國(guó)家安全顧問(wèn)）的中國(guó)之行，以及基辛格訪(fǎng)問(wèn)前所做的秘密準(zhǔn)備。在書(shū)中，基辛格對(duì)中國(guó)歷史進(jìn)行了簡(jiǎn)單回顧，剖析了會(huì)見(jiàn)過(guò)的幾位領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的性格，并詳細(xì)描述了會(huì)面時(shí)的細(xì)節(jié)?；粮窨偨Y(jié)了近年來(lái)中國(guó)所取得的成就，就民主價(jià)值觀(guān)（或曰普世價(jià)值）與外交實(shí)務(wù)之間的關(guān)系

28、表達(dá)了一些總體看法，并毫不出人意料地表示：他對(duì)美國(guó)與這個(gè)世界第一人口大國(guó)合作的前景充滿(mǎn)期待。 從很多方面來(lái)看，《論中國(guó)》是基辛格對(duì)其畢生追求的一些要?jiǎng)?wù)的辯解。盡管基辛格提到了美國(guó)對(duì)多元主義、民主與人權(quán)近乎宗教般的執(zhí)著，但他同時(shí)辯稱(chēng)，這些合理關(guān)注不應(yīng)妨礙對(duì)于國(guó)家利益的追求，而在40年的時(shí)間里，與中國(guó)恢復(fù)邦交一直符合美國(guó)的國(guó)家利益。此外，在謀求與中國(guó)恢復(fù)友好邦交的初始階段，另一個(gè)額外好處（同時(shí)也的確是動(dòng)機(jī)之一）就是：孤立蘇聯(lián)(Soviet Union)。近年來(lái)，在美國(guó)忙于處理各種國(guó)際事務(wù)之際，中國(guó)常常采取配合的姿態(tài)，比如在伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)之前，相對(duì)于美國(guó)一些討厭的歐洲盟友，中國(guó)反而顯得“更加合作”。 基辛格在書(shū)中寫(xiě)道：“評(píng)判政治家，要看他們能否長(zhǎng)期堅(jiān)持其理念?！碑?dāng)然，基辛格非常樂(lè)于提到一點(diǎn)：他很早就意識(shí)到一個(gè)繁榮、開(kāi)放的中國(guó)對(duì)世界有利?？梢岳斫?，他認(rèn)為對(duì)人權(quán)問(wèn)題的過(guò)度關(guān)注不應(yīng)干擾嚴(yán)肅的外交，或許事實(shí)證明這一看法是正確的，但最近中東的事態(tài)發(fā)展卻傾向于得出相反的結(jié)論。關(guān)于民主，最終并不存在什么“阿拉伯例外”，或許也不存在什么“中國(guó)例外”，近來(lái)中國(guó)安全機(jī)構(gòu)的所作所為，似乎也印證了這一點(diǎn)。 通過(guò)研究大綱發(fā)現(xiàn)，這種題型需要修改的錯(cuò)誤之處主要有：（1）單詞翻譯不當(dāng)，（2）句子成分搭配不當(dāng)，（3）長(zhǎng)、難句翻譯錯(cuò)誤，（4）文化背景理解有誤。