當(dāng)代美國(guó) 考試題目及答案

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1、 得分 評(píng)閱人 一、 Paraphrase（共3小題，每題10分，共30分） 1. Religion in the United States is remarkable both in its high adherence level as well as its diversity. 2. Feminism has altered predominant perspectives in a wide range of areas within Western society, ranging from culture to law. 3. The most fr

2、ightening aspect of the riots was their tendency to polarize society on racial lines. 4. The three powers: executive, legislative and judicial branches are separate and distinct from one another. The powers are given to each are delicately balanced by the powers of the other two. Each branch serve

3、s as a check on potential excesses of the others. 5. The public worries about communism, which was caused by the reality of the Soviet Union’s military power, the attack on Korea, the loss of the nuclear monopoly, and the stories about spies, some of them true. 6. The United States Constitution is

4、 silent on the subject of political organizations, mainly because most of the founding fathers disliked them. Yet, major and minor political parties and groups soon arose. 得分 評(píng)閱人 二、Summarize the paragraphs in one sentence （共2小題，每小題10分，共20分） 1. This team engaged in assorted dirty tricks

5、, including soliciting illegal contributions for the campaign and laundered money through Mexican bank accounts, seeking to bar the publication of so-called Pentagon Papers which exposed the role of the presidents and military leaders in deceiving the public and Congress about the conduct of the US

6、in the Southeast Asia. 2. The officially stated goals of the foreign policy of the United States, as mentioned in the Foreign Policy Agenda of the U.S. Department of State, are "to create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international co

7、mmunity ." 3. The American variety of English contains numerous loan words from European, Native American, Asian and African languages, that frequently also enter other varieties of English through American English. 4. Religion in the United States is remarkable both in its high adherence level

8、as well as its diversity. The First Amendment to the country's Constitution prevents the government from having any authority in religion, and guarantees the free exercise of religion. A majority of Americans report that religion plays a "very important" role in their lives, a proportion unusual amo

9、ng developed nations, though similar to other nations in the Americas. Many faiths have flourished in the United States, including imports spanning the country's multicultural heritage as well as those founded within the country, and have led the United States to become the most religiously diverse

10、country in the world. 得分 評(píng)閱人 三、Translation（共2小題，每小題10分，共20分） 1. His concluding words catch the spirit of the inaugural perfectly: I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break, our bonds of affection. The m

11、ystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart…will yet swell the chorus of the Union when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature. 2. The United States has been one of the best-performing developed countries, co

12、nsistently outperforming European countries. The American labor market has attracted immigrants from all over the world and has one of the world's highest migration rates. Americans have the second highest income per hour worked. 3. Most hippies resembled the radicals in their political and soc

13、ial opinions, but they rejected activism. As a way of life and a culture, the Hippies can still be found everywhere in the world, including China. 4. For two weeks they conferred at Camp David, the presidential retreat outside the capital, and Carter’s mediation had much to do with their successf

14、ul negotiations. 得分 評(píng)閱人 四、Questions（共2小題，每小題15分，共30分） 1. Do you learn something from this course? If yes, give your points. If no, give your suggestions. 2. Give a comment on the following article. China’s Rise, the United States, and Asia’s Angst by Robert Sutter Robert Sutter [sut

15、terr@georgetown.edu] is Visiting Professor of Asian Studies at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington DC. He recently completed consultations with officials and non-government opinion leaders in 15 Asian-Pacific cities. Americans interacting with officials and other expert

16、s in the Asia-Pacific region in recent weeks would be reassured that official and other expert opinion among US allies and associates seems to disagree with prevailing media commentary in these countries depicting the United States in decline and China emerging to challenge the US leadership in the

17、region. The officials and nongovernment experts recognize that China has a long way to go to emerge as Asia’s leader. China has a hard job to reassure its neighbors as a result of over four decades of often very negative and disruptive behavior by the PRC in Asia from 1949 until the end of the Co

18、ld War. China’s record in the region since then has sometimes lapsed into episodes of coercion and intimidation that remind neighbors of the negative past. Patriotism and nationalism in China make compromise difficult with other equally patriotic and nationalistic Asian countries over salient terri

19、torial, economic, or other disputes. China’s win-win diplomacy is reassuring on the one hand but it also makes clear that China will do little for the Asia-Pacific region that does not benefit China in direct and concrete ways. (China’s recent initial pledge of only $10 million to help longstandin

20、g Chinese associate Pakistan deal with massive flood damage underlines continued Chinese unwillingness to undertake the risks, costs, and commitments of regional leadership.) Asian neighbors are often suspicious of China’s military buildup and longer term intentions. As a result they have a tendenc

21、y to engage in contingency plans while they try to benefit from economic and other exchanges with rising China. They often build up their military forces, endeavor to enmesh China into regional organizations, and encourage the United States to remain deeply involved with them and the region. By con

22、trast, the United States is seen to be in a unique position in providing security and economic public goods essential for Asian governments seeking legitimacy through development. Development requires stability and because Asian governments tend not to trust one another very well, they have come to

23、 rely on the very expensive and often quite risky US commitment of military forces in the region to preserve stability. The governments recognize that no other Asian government or coalition of forces will undertake these costs, risks and commitments. They also recognize that much of the processing

24、 trade that makes up half of China’s trade and much of the regional trade depends on exports out of the region, and that the United States annually absorbs several hundreds of billions of dollars of Asian goods, running a massive trade deficit that neither China nor any other Asian power would endu

25、re. Other US strengths welcomed by China’s neighbors include the active role of the US military, intelligence, and other security organizations play in interaction with almost all countries in the region; and the broad webs of longstanding positive US relations with the region developed by the uniq

26、uely active nongovernment sector in the US, including the role of millions of Asian immigrants since the change in US immigration policy in 1965. Asia’s angst—uncertainty about the future Officials and experts in regional countries allied and associated with the United States on the one hand have

27、tended to welcome the recent US activism in regional groups and US public postures countering unilateral Chinese claims to territorial, resource, and navigation rights in nearby international waters. On the other hand, they are anxious about a possible escalation of tensions between the United State

28、s and China that might be hard to manage and could prove to be detrimental to their concerns about preserving regional stability. They look to the US to manage differences with China in ways that off-set perceived Chinese coercion and expansionism but avoid confrontation and tension. For now, many

29、are preoccupied with what kind of reaction China will have in response to Secretary of State Clinton’s intervention regarding stability and navigation rights in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi in July, and to the presence of a US aircraft carrier and other advanced s

30、hips off the coast of Vietnam in celebration of a recent US-Vietnamese anniversary. They also question what plans the United States has to manage China’s possible responses in ways that do not undermine regional stability. Meanwhile, many officials and nongovernment experts have strong concerns abo

31、ut the longer term future. They wonder whether the United States can sustain its military and economic commitments to the region. The global economic crisis and US recession have resulted in massive government debt that raises questions about future US military spending. The crisis and recession als

32、o challenge US free trade policies and the sustainability of the US asymmetrical trade relationships with Asia. China, for its part, seems positioned to continue economic, military, and political advances. China’s military buildup has already raised serious questions about US ability to come to Ta

33、iwan’s defense in the event of a Chinese attack against the island. Chinese anti-access efforts might hamper US abilities to protect its interests in other areas along the Chinese periphery. Challenges for the US Somewhat nervous allies and associates are likely to pose special challenges for US d

34、iplomacy. As the government deepens its involvement in sensitive regional issues, Asian friends and others will be watching carefully how well the US balances efforts to off-set Chinese unilateralism and intimidation while avoiding serious and disruptive confrontation or conflict. They also will be

35、watching how well the US sustains its military leadership and open markets for Asian trade. US handling of sensitive issues like Taiwan are complicated as some friends in the Asia-Pacific aver privately that Taiwan’s perceived gravitation into China’s orbit, even with the acquiescence of the Taiwan

36、 administration, would make it more difficult for the US to reassure Japan, Australia, and other allies of its staying power as China rises. Many US friends and associates want to know what will characterize the new Asian order and how they can best position their governments in the order. Since pre

37、vailing circumstances argue for considerable flux in the Asian order for some time to come, the United States likely will be called upon repeatedly to reassure, stabilize, and avoid actions seen as disruptive or confrontational. 2. China in 2010: The Perils of Impatience by Denny Roy Denny Roy

38、 [RoyD@EastWestCenter.org] is Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center. Against a background of recent Chinese behavior widely perceived as unusually assertive, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s policy speech in Hawaii on Oct. 28 reiterated the commitm

39、ent of the United States, despite two ongoing wars and an economic downturn, to commit the resources and attention necessary to maintain US leadership in Asia for the long term. This points up a problem for the Chinese. The greatest single foreign-policy challenge for the government of a rising Chi

40、na is to balance two objectives that easily clash. The first is to build a reputation as a responsible, principled great power that will be a “force for peace” rather than a regional bully. The second is to satisfy demands from the Chinese public and some Chinese elites that China begin to act like

41、a strong country and stand up more strongly for what they see as China's interests. Beijing is very aware of the historical danger of neighboring countries banding together to “encircle” a rising power and has expended great diplomatic energy to preclude this outcome. The Chinese are quick to conde

42、mn any talk of a “China threat” as a plot to suppress China’s natural and rightful fulfillment of its potential, which includes bringing prosperity to China’s huge population. Beijing often interprets US diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific as a plot to recruit allies in the “containment” of China. At the

43、 same time, however, Hu Jintao’s government has urged China's people to feel pride in the international community's recognition of China as a great power. This reflects well on Hu’s legacy as the country heads into a leadership transition, but it also emboldens nationalistic Chinese citizens as well

44、 as the military leadership to ask why China continues to tolerate those aspects of international affairs that China is unhappy about. This has required Chinese leaders to maintain a delicate balance between patience and assertiveness. In 2010, Beijing has clearly lost its balance. Deng Xiaoping ad

45、vised his successors to be restrained, to shelve difficult issues, and to avoid taking the lead in international affairs until China has consolidated its internal and external strength by completing the present phase of economic and social development. This year, however, has seen a troubling patte

46、rn of strong Chinese reaction over issues Beijing prefers to keep on the back burner. The exposure of China’s agenda to shield the North Korean regime from the effects of international opprobrium and economic sanctions after two nuclear weapons tests and the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheon

47、an was disappointing enough. China’s strident statements about planned US-South Korean naval exercises off the South Korean coast, which were aimed at North Korea rather than China, suggested the Chinese viewed the entire Yellow Sea as part of a sphere of influence in which foreign navies should be

48、bound by Chinese wishes. When Clinton, after consultation with Southeast Asian governments, called for a collaborative multilateral approach to disputed territory in the South China Sea, PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi characterized her statement as “in effect an attack on China.” Chinese official

49、s and retired generals have made remarks implying some form of Chinese ownership over most of the South China Sea, while the Chinese government refuses to clarify its claim beyond the infamous, breathtakingly expansive “9-dashed line.” Chinese officials played hardball by cutting supplies of economi

50、cally vital rare earth elements to Japan as a punishment for Japan’s detention of a Chinese fishing-boat captain who allegedly rammed Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the disputed Senkakku/Diaoyutai Islands – and this after Tokyo had released the captain. Outside analysts have some understanding o

51、f the pressures on the Chinese leadership. Public opinion has become a force to be reckoned with, and it tends to be exuberantly nationalistic. Anger over perceived affronts to China’s national honor or encroachments on vital Chinese interests (hot buttons that territorial disputes invariably push)

52、often quickly turns to criticism of the Chinese government for failing to defend the country’s interests. Nevertheless, the Chinese leadership should not underestimate the costs of energizing “anti-China” forces they so often criticize. Chinese acts that international opinion judges to be excessive

53、 undercut Beijing’s cultivation of a welcoming environment for China’s rise. All indications are that Chinese leaders still worry about greatly about domestic problems such as tackling corruption, raising living standards, re-building the social welfare system, balancing urban-rural and east-west de

54、velopment, and keeping a lid on social discontent. China is not prepared to embark on a campaign to revise the rules of regional interaction. Nor is it strong enough externally to shift from assurance to intimidation. The United States remains the region’s strongest military power. Several other imp

55、ortant states are closely tied into a broad US-sponsored security agenda through alliances and US bases, and other states would quickly move toward greater security cooperation if they perceived China as threatening. Many Chinese officials recognize their country has suffered strategic and diplomat

56、ic losses at least partly because of how China has reacted to regional events. It isn’t clear whether the Chinese government can maintain a balanced foreign policy without succumbing to domestic pressures demanding actions that even top policymakers recognize are strategically short-sighted. 3.

57、 Tip of the Spear: the 13 Missions for US Marines in Okinawa by Tetsuo Kotani Tetsuo Kotani (tetsuo.kotani@) is a special research fellow at the Okazaki Institute in Tokyo. He is also a member of the Project 2049 Institute International Advisory Council, a senior research fellow at the Research Ins

58、titute for Peace and Security (RIPS), and a Pacific Forum CSIS Nonresident SPF Fellow. Confusion over the Futenma Relocation Facility (FRF) damaged the US-Japan alliance and raised concerns among regional countries about the direction of the alliance. Before resigning from office, former Prime Mini

59、ster Hatoyama Yukio said he finally understood the role the Marine Corps play in providing deterrence and the need for marines to be on Okinawa. Throughout the mishandling of the FRF imbroglio, it was apparent that there was little understanding in Japan of the role Marines play when called upon. T

60、hey can storm beaches in classic amphibious fashion, defend Japanese territory in support of the Security Treaty, etc., and much more. Every marine is a rifleman Regardless of military occupational specialty, every marine is first and foremost a disciplined warrior and part of a lean, versatile, f

61、lexible and ready force organized, trained, and equipped to operate from ships or to fight ashore as an air and ground combined armed force. This integrated force -- known as the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) -- consists of organic air, ground and logistics elements under a single command ele

62、ment, and enables the MAGTF to conduct self-sustained operations autonomously or with other forces. ?The MAGTF is unique among militaries of the world in many aspects and is the key to Marine operations. ?It provides a balanced, combined-arms force, which is scalable to meet the mission. One key as

63、pect is the ease by which a MAGTF ashore, by either permissive or forcible means, can be increased in size, capability and capacity to meet a growing requirement or threat. ?It arrives, usually from the sea, with the required logistics to self-sustain ashore for a period of time that increases with

64、the size of the MAGTF. ?Whether involved in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, combat operations, or any other operation across the spectrum, the MAGTF is the world’s premiere emergency response force, and the presence of Marines in Japan is a testament to US dedication to security in the regi

65、on. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the smallest scale MAGTF, consisting of 1,500-3,000 Marines, and is forward-deployed around the world. ?The MEUs are characterized by their sea-based forward presence, expeditionary nature, ability to plan and respond to crises, and are combined arms, air-

66、 and ground-force capable. ?The 31st MEU is based in Okinawa, Japan, and the 11th, the 13th, and 15th MEUs are based in Camp Pendleton, California. The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is a rapidly deployable mid-sized MAGTF consisting of up to 20,000 Marines, and provides amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore for approximately 30 days. The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the largest MAGTF consisting of 20,000-90,000 Marines. ?The MEF is the principle Marine warfigh