對(duì)群眾的控制：多數(shù)主義法院的反映輿論的原則畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯

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1、Crowd Control:The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in Doctrine 1.Introduction The judicial branch of the federal government has historically had an uneasy relationship with public opinion. Like the executive and legislative branches,the judiciary depends on public support

2、for its legitimacy. But unlike the political branches, the judiciary is not electorally accountable to those whose support it requires. To the contrary, one of its defining attributes is the dury to thwart political expressions of popular will that run afoul of the Constitution Nevertheless, it has

3、been noted that ”the arguments of appellate judges in the Common Law world necessarily rest, according to some legal scholars, on community consensus about extralegal values.” In other words, the often counter-majoritarian judiciary must produce results acceptable to the general public over the long

4、 term in order to maintain its legitimacy. Professor Chemerinsky has posited that the judiciary’s legitimacy actually hinges on both the general acceptability of the result it produces and the relative consisitency of the methods by which those results are reached. Traditionally, scholary and judic

5、ial commentary on the influence of public opinion on the federal judiciary has followed two courses. Some commentators and jurists argue that judicial independence requires that public opinion have no influence on judicial decision-making. Another group of scholars advocates an indirectly influentia

6、l role to “objective” measures of scholars advocates an indirectly influential role for public opinion in limited contexts. These scholars believe judges should refer to “objective” measures of public opinion as guidelines when deciding questions of statutory interpretation and delineating the Eight

7、h Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unsual punishment.” Recent developments in empirical research suggest that these positions take too limited a view of public opinion as an influence on judicial decision-making. The research suggests that the “judicial isolation” model conflicts with reality-

8、the influence of public opinion may be inevitable. This Article will examine this evidence, which suggests that many judges are influenced-at least marginally –by public opinion. Because the judiciary is the one branch of the federal government committed to a transparent decision-making process in v

9、arious contexts. The mechanics of this apparent influence have significant consequences for how we conceive of the relationship between public opinion and judicial outcome and whether this apparent influence is in fact a threat to judicial independence. One might expert public opinion to exert its

10、influence though the juficiary’s interaction with the political branches into which democracy channel it, and it is to these interaction that this Article turns first in its inquiry into the mechanics of public opinion’s apparent influence on judicial outcomes. But political controls, such as Congre

11、ssional control over jurisdiction and budget, are blunt instruments. The political costs of threatening as a means to influence the judiciary on a case-by-case basis. Presidential refusal to execute the judiciary’s rulings is a more precise-but rarely invoked-constraint. Formal political constraint

12、s ultimately fail to explain public opinion’s influence on individual cases. The Article next turns to more informal influences on judicial decisions. These constraints include the role of stare decisis and the appellate process, as well as concerns about the jurist’s indiwidual reputation and that

13、 of the judiciary as a whole. Public opinion may reinforce several of these constraints, but seems to have most of its influence where these constrains leave jurists with discretion. Public opinion thus appears to operate in much the same sphere as the judge’s own political ideology, which, accordin

14、g to the “attitudinal” model of judicial decision-making, the judge may promote within the scope of the discretion afforded by precedent. Because consideration of both formal and informal constraints and attitudinal models of decision-making yields unsatisfying answers, the Article turns from influ

15、ences extemal to the judicial decision-making framework and exanmines the framework itself. In an attempt to understand the apparent influence of public opinion, this Article imagines what a principled incorporation of public opinion into the various analyses might look like if public opinion were a

16、n explicit, rather than mysterious, influence on judicial outcomes, beginning with an examination of one case where the Court did consider public opinion polls as part of its legal analysis. This thought experiment ultimately suggests another explanation for the correlation of public opinion and jud

17、icial output. The Supreme Court’s citation of opinion polls in Atkins v. Virginia suggests that polls may be useful evidence of public opinion if public opinion had a legitimate place in legal analysis. The use of opinion polls as evidence of public opinion would expand the universe of issues about

18、 which there may be judicially knowable public opinion, and represent a significant step towards the potential principled incorporation of public opinion into judicial decision-making. Although the court’s use of opinion polls was unfortunate because the polls were not subject to examination and cri

19、ticism by expert witnesses in the trail court, polls are potentially important and powerful evidence of public opinion. The criticisms leveled at the court’s use of opinion polls in Atkins, moreover, suggests that public opinion can be measured accurately enough to be of use to judges. The traditio

20、nal “srectrum of deference” suggests it is possible to make a reasoned evaluation of the appropriateness of public opinion as an influence in various judicial contexts. The spectrum is based on a realistic evaluation of the relative institutional advantages of the judiciary and Congress, and affords

21、 Congress varying degress of deference depending on the various functions implicated by the decision-making cotext. Although the consideration are not identical when the question is the consideration of public opinion rather than deference to the will of a political branch, an examination of the val

22、ues underlying our government and the judiciary’s insititutional abilities will illuminate when and how the judiciary may reflect public opinion. For example,Professor Eskridge has argued that public values ought to and do influence the process of stantory interpretation.No Atkins suggests that pub

23、lic opinion,which may amount to something less than Eskridge’s public values, might influence the prosses of statutory interpretation depending on the strength of the prefererce and the strength of other traditional indicators of statutory meaning. Federal common law is anther poterntial context fo

24、r the consideration of public opinion. Although the common law does not always directly reflect public preferreces, democratic principles suggest that public opinion could be relevant to determining common law rules. The common law context illuminates several instances where public opinion should no

25、t be considered-in most cases where the rule may affect the public’s tax burden, or where public opinion is adverse to a minority or individual who does not enjoy constitutional protecion related to the rule of law to be decided. Public opinion could also theoretically play a role in constitutional

26、 adjudication. Perhaps ironically, determining where legislation is within Congress’s power under the Interstate Commerce Clausae –in which the Court grants Congress substantial deference-proves to be an inappropriate doctrine for incorporating public opinion. The reason is two fold. First, there is

27、 no reason to believe that the public has any inherent advantage over the judiciary in determining whether an activity substantiallu affects interstate commerce. Second, the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence serves merely to channel public opinion to the consitutionally appropriate decision-make

28、r-a determination for which the popularity of the legislation in question seems irrelevant. Nevertheless,public opinion fits surprisingly well into other consitutional doctrines. The vindication of national opinion over a majority in a smaller constituency may justify comsideration of public opinio

29、n in the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Doctrinal developments in Lawrence v. Texas suggest that public opinion could become a legitimate and explict consideration in the substantive due process arena. In the course of striking down Texas’s law against homosexual sodomy only seventeen y

30、ears after upholding the states’ ability to prohibit such conduct in Bowers v. Hardwick,the Lawrence Court engaged in analysis that bore striking similarities to ite Eighth Amendment analysis in Ackins. The Lawrence Court thus pointed to a doctinal place for public opinion in its substantive due pro

31、cess jurisprudence. Because similar developments have not occurred in the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence, this Article reserves judgment regarding the fit of public opinion into equal protection doctrine. The examination of how public opinion might fit into various judicial doctrines sugges

32、ts where and how public opinion may influence outcomes. In most instances, the correlation of public opinion and judicial outcomes is the result of the process by which judges routinely make decisions rather than an influence external to the decision-making process.This influence therefore need not

33、be viewed as a threat to judicial independence.Current doctrine is, across the board, well designed to reflect public opinion. This Article proceeds as follows:Part 2 identifies several instances where there is agreement that public opinion must not play a role in judicial decision-making, and exam

34、ines the competing judical traditions regarding the role of public opinion in consitutional sdjudication.Part 3 the surveys evidence that public opinion influences judicial decision-making, and concldes that public opinion may have a marginal effect. It next attempts to explain how this influence op

35、erates, but finds both political and informal intra-judicial constraints inadequate to account for public opinion’s influence on the judiciary. Finally, it examines the use of opinion polls in Arkins to determine the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishment.”P(pán)art 4 examines judicial decisional tools

36、 themselves to explain the apparent effect of public opinion on judicial decision-making. It first outlines the traditional spectrum of deference,which serves as an example for the context-specific analysis of whether public opinion could be apporiate as an example for the context-specific analysis

37、of whether public opinion could be appropriate as a doctrinal consideration in various contexts. It next examines whether public opinion could be a legitimate consideration in various contexts, including statutory interpretation, common law-making, and several consititutional contexts. The Article c

38、oncludes by examining the tendency of various doctrines to reflect public opinion, and the effect of recent jurisprudence on the public opinion-mirroring ablity of those doctrines. 2.The Debate over Public Opinion in Judicial Decision-making 2.1 Public Opinion as Anathema to Judicial Independence

39、 There is widespread agreement that in certain cases, public opinion should not play any role in a judge’s decision. For example, determinations of whether probable cause exists to try a defendant is guilty.Nor should public animus influence individual sentencing decisions. A recent example of these

40、 dangears is illuminating. In 1995,Federal District Judge Baer of the Southern District of New York presided over a high profile drug prosecution. After a hearing where Judge Baer found the testimony of defence witnesses credible and the testimory of police officers ”incredible.” he encluded large

41、quantities of drugs and a confession,rulling that they were obtained in violution of the defenfant’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The public and political responses were immediate. The New York Times ran several editorials condemning the ruling. Members of Congress spoke publicly about impeac

42、hment, and some even asked President Clinton to add his voice to the criticism. In the meantime ,Judge Baer granted a rehearing on the supperession motion. President Clinton declined to comment on the case pending the results of the rehearing.According to the New York Times, a group of Circuit Court

43、 judges, and several commentators, the message to Judge Baer was clear:reverse yourself, or risk losing losing your job, despite the convention against impeaching federal judges because of their decisions. After rehearing the motion, Judge Baer reversed his original decision and admitted the eviden

44、ce,citing newly-introduced police reports as additional evidence that compelled him to change his mind. But critics claim that this additional evidence could not have been a sufficient ground for reversal, and may have even hurt the prosecution’s case by creating additional inconsistencies with the

45、officers’ testimony. Judge Baer was in a no-win situation.There was negative publicity about his original decision to exclude the evidence, and there would be a negative public reaction to a change of position based on his decision to include the evidence-both of which could undermine public confide

46、nce in the impartial nature of the judiciary. The lat Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote about the effects of public opinion on the judicial decision-making process, concluding that “no judge can consciously say in so many words.”I gave you my best judgment when I decided that the Constritation meant th

47、us and so, but since the public overwhelmingly disagrees with my interpretation of the Constitution meat thus and so, but since the public overwhelmingly disagrees with my interpretation of the Consitution. I will therefore change my mind. “On its face, this statement appears to reject public opinio

48、n as a considerational adjudication, a position consistent with much of Pehnquist’s jurisprudence. In these contexts, capitulation to contrary public opinion would signal the end of judicial independence. But a careful consideration of public opinion in certain cases does not necessarily indicate a

49、n erosion of judicial independece. Commerntators and jurists have long acknowledged the influence of public opinion without concluding that the judiciary has abdicated its responsibility of independent judgment. 2.2 Competing Judicial Views on the Propriety on Considering Public Opinion Commentat

50、ors and jurisis have long recognized the effect of public opinion on the judiciary incircumstances where it is not a threat ti judicial indepence. The Chief Justice Rehnquist, drawing on his experience as a law clerk to Justicce Jacksonn, concluded that public opinion had a significant influence on

51、the Court’s disposition in the “Steel Seizure”case. In 1952, President Truman, fearing that a reduction in steel production would hinder the Korean War effort, ordered federal officials to seize and operate several steel production facilities during a strike. Steel companies brought suit and obtaine

52、d an injunction from the district cout enjoining the court of appeals and appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which granted ceriorari and heaard arguments nine days later. The Court rejected the government’s argument that the size was jusitified by certain powers given to the Predident under Art

53、icle 2 of the Consitutution. The timing of the government’s “inherent power”argument was not good, as support for both the Korean War and President Trnman was at its nadir. Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the tides of public opinion,accelerated and intensified by the rapid movement of the ca

54、se through the federal judicial system, influenced the Court’s decision. Ackowledging public opinion’s influence and incorporating it into doctrine are separate propositions, however,Chief Justice Rehnquist repeatedly dissented from opinions taking public opinion into account, stating that public

55、opinion was conditutionally irrelevant.Jusice Scalia agreed with Rchnquist’s theory ,commcnting on “how upsetting it is, that so many of our citizens…think that we Juditices should properly take into account their views, as though we were engaged not in ascertaining an objective law but in determini

56、ng some kind of social consensus. Chief Justice Rehnquist also drew considerable support for his position from a longstanding belief among the public that judges do not:and must not-consider public opinion in making decisions. Moreover, many jurists share this view of the judiciary and of their own

57、 work. Justice Douglas described judges as strong amid the winds of political change.Chief Justice Burger wrote that “l(fā)egislatures, not courts, are consitituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.” Justice Powell agreed, nothing that “the asscssment of popular opi

58、nion is essentially a legislative, not a judicial, function.” Justice Frankfurter also wrote that courts are unlike representtative bodies because they “are not designed to be a good reflex of a democraticratic society.” Support for public opinion as a factor in judicial decesion-making among U.S.

59、Court of Appeals judges is mixed. Of thhirth-five judges surveyed in 1981, only one responded that public opinion was “a very important” factor, while eight said that it was “moderately important” and twenty-two said that it was “not important”. Judge Tacha of the Tenth Circuit declared that public

60、opinion should have no influence whatsoever in articulating ideal judicial procedure. Justice Story wrote that ”it is not for judges to listen to-popular appeal.” Chief Justice Taney also addressed the role of public opinion in Dred Scot v. Santord, concluding that current public opinion was irrele

61、vant to constitutional interpretation. Strictly denying the influence of public opinion is problematic in several respects, however. First, it does not appear to reflect reality. Evidence discussed below suggests that public opinion influences judicial decision-making, even if only at an unconscious

62、 level. Second, in some circumstances, public opinion could be a legitumate consideration for a policy-making court. There is also a tradition of recognizing public opinion in certain constitutional contexts. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennselvania v. Casey, Justice Souter cirted divided

63、 public opinion as a reason to uphold the central holding in Roe v. Wade. According to Justice Somter, the Court should refrain from reversing its watershed cases until substantial public opinion for the decision becomes unfavorable. Justice Souter’s incorporation of public opinion into constutitut

64、ional doctrine is also firmly grounded in judicial tradition. In 1812, the Court held in United States v. Hudson that the federal courts lacked the power to make criminal common law. In the decision, Justice Johnson stated that although this question is brought up now for the first time to be decide

65、d by this Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion. In no other case for many years has this jurisdicting been asserted; and the general acquiescence of legal men shews the prevalence of opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition.

66、 中文翻譯 對(duì)群眾的控制：多數(shù)主義法院的反映輿論的原則 作者：本杰明-J-羅斯切 一、序言 聯(lián)邦國(guó)家機(jī)關(guān)的司法部門(mén)有史以來(lái)就與社會(huì)輿論有著令人不安的關(guān)系。如同行政和立法部門(mén)，司法部門(mén)也有賴(lài)于從大眾的支持中獲得合法地位。但不同于政治部門(mén)的是司法部門(mén)并非通過(guò)被選舉的方式來(lái)對(duì)支持他們的人負(fù)責(zé)。相反，它的固有職責(zé)之一就是阻止那些違憲的群眾性政治表達(dá)。然而，根據(jù)一些法學(xué)學(xué)者的說(shuō)法，有人指出普通法系的上訴法院法官的觀點(diǎn)必須有必要建立在社會(huì)最法外價(jià)值的共識(shí)上。換句話(huà)說(shuō)，那些常常反對(duì)多數(shù)主義的法官也必須做出社會(huì)大眾在長(zhǎng)期內(nèi)能接受的判決以維持其合法地位。凱姆林斯基教授提出假說(shuō)：“司法的合理性取決于其判決的社會(huì)接受度和得出這個(gè)判決的程序合法性?！? 傳統(tǒng)上認(rèn)為，學(xué)者和法官在輿論對(duì)聯(lián)邦司法部門(mén)的影響上的分析主要是走兩個(gè)路徑：一些評(píng)論家和法學(xué)家認(rèn)為司法獨(dú)立要求輿論對(duì)司法判決的作出不應(yīng)當(dāng)產(chǎn)生任何影響，另一群學(xué)者則提倡語(yǔ)錄在例外情形下可以對(duì)司法判決的作出產(chǎn)生間接的影響。這些學(xué)者認(rèn)為法官應(yīng)該在某些情況下尋求公眾輿論作為“客觀”的指引，比如在作出法律解釋時(shí)，在界定什么是第八