當(dāng)代美國 考試題目及答案

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1、得分評(píng)閱人一、 Paraphrase（共3小題，每題10分，共30分）1. Religion in the United States is remarkable both in its high adherence level as well as its diversity. 2. Feminism has altered predominant perspectives in a wide range of areas within Western society, ranging from culture to law. 3. The most frightening aspect o

2、f the riots was their tendency to polarize society on racial lines. 4. The three powers: executive, legislative and judicial branches are separate and distinct from one another. The powers are given to each are delicately balanced by the powers of the other two. Each branch serves as a check on pote

3、ntial excesses of the others.5. The public worries about communism, which was caused by the reality of the Soviet Unions military power, the attack on Korea, the loss of the nuclear monopoly, and the stories about spies, some of them true.6. The United States Constitution is silent on the subject of

4、 political organizations, mainly because most of the founding fathers disliked them. Yet, major and minor political parties and groups soon arose.得分評(píng)閱人二、Summarize the paragraphs in one sentence （共2小題，每小題10分，共20分）1. This team engaged in assorted dirty tricks, including soliciting illegal contribution

5、s for the campaign and laundered money through Mexican bank accounts, seeking to bar the publication of so-called Pentagon Papers which exposed the role of the presidents and military leaders in deceiving the public and Congress about the conduct of the US in the Southeast Asia.2. The officially sta

6、ted goals of the foreign policy of the United States, as mentioned in the Foreign Policy Agenda of the U.S. Department of State, are to create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community .3. The American variety of English co

7、ntains numerous loan words from European, Native American, Asian and African languages, that frequently also enter other varieties of English through American English.4. Religion in the United States is remarkable both in its high adherence level as well as its diversity. The First Amendment to the

8、countrys Constitution prevents the government from having any authority in religion, and guarantees the free exercise of religion. A majority of Americans report that religion plays a very important role in their lives, a proportion unusual among developed nations, though similar to other nations in

9、 the Americas. Many faiths have flourished in the United States, including imports spanning the countrys multicultural heritage as well as those founded within the country, and have led the United States to become the most religiously diverse country in the world.得分評(píng)閱人三、Translation（共2小題，每小題10分，共20分）

10、1. His concluding words catch the spirit of the inaugural perfectly: I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break, our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot g

11、rave to every living heartwill yet swell the chorus of the Union when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.2. The United States has been one of the best-performing developed countries, consistently outperforming European countries. The American labor market has a

12、ttracted immigrants from all over the world and has one of the worlds highest migration rates. Americans have the second highest income per hour worked. 3. Most hippies resembled the radicals in their political and social opinions, but they rejected activism. As a way of life and a culture, the Hipp

13、ies can still be found everywhere in the world, including China.4. For two weeks they conferred at Camp David, the presidential retreat outside the capital, and Carters mediation had much to do with their successful negotiations. 得分評(píng)閱人四、Questions（共2小題，每小題15分，共30分）1. Do you learn something from this

14、course? If yes, give your points. If no, give your suggestions.2. Give a comment on the following article.Chinas Rise, the United States, and Asias Angstby Robert SutterRobert Sutter sutterrgeorgetown.edu is Visiting Professor of Asian Studies at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University,

15、 Washington DC. He recently completed consultations with officials and non-government opinion leaders in 15 Asian-Pacific cities.Americans interacting with officials and other experts in the Asia-Pacific region in recent weeks would be reassured that official and other expert opinion among US allies

16、 and associates seems to disagree with prevailing media commentary in these countries depicting the United States in decline and China emerging to challenge the US leadership in the region. The officials and nongovernment experts recognize that China has a long way to go to emerge as Asias leader. C

17、hina has a hard job to reassure its neighbors as a result of over four decades of often very negative and disruptive behavior by the PRC in Asia from 1949 until the end of the Cold War.Chinas record in the region since then has sometimes lapsed into episodes of coercion and intimidation that remind

18、neighbors of the negative past. Patriotism and nationalism in China make compromise difficult with other equally patriotic and nationalistic Asian countries over salient territorial, economic, or other disputes. Chinas win-win diplomacy is reassuring on the one hand but it also makes clear that Chin

19、a will do little for the Asia-Pacific region that does not benefit China in direct and concrete ways. (Chinas recent initial pledge of only $10 million to help longstanding Chinese associate Pakistan deal with massive flood damage underlines continued Chinese unwillingness to undertake the risks, co

20、sts, and commitments of regional leadership.)Asian neighbors are often suspicious of Chinas military buildup and longer term intentions. As a result they have a tendency to engage in contingency plans while they try to benefit from economic and other exchanges with rising China. They often build up

21、their military forces, endeavor to enmesh China into regional organizations, and encourage the United States to remain deeply involved with them and the region.By contrast, the United States is seen to be in a unique position in providing security and economic public goods essential for Asian govern

22、ments seeking legitimacy through development. Development requires stability and because Asian governments tend not to trust one another very well, they have come to rely on the very expensive and often quite risky US commitment of military forces in the region to preserve stability.The governments

23、recognize that no other Asian government or coalition of forces will undertake these costs, risks and commitments. They also recognize that much of the processing trade that makes up half of Chinas trade and much of the regional trade depends on exports out of the region, and that the United States

24、annually absorbs several hundreds of billions of dollars of Asian goods, running a massive trade deficit that neither China nor any other Asian power would endure.Other US strengths welcomed by Chinas neighbors include the active role of the US military, intelligence, and other security organization

25、s play in interaction with almost all countries in the region; and the broad webs of longstanding positive US relations with the region developed by the uniquely active nongovernment sector in the US, including the role of millions of Asian immigrants since the change in US immigration policy in 196

26、5.Asias angstuncertainty about the futureOfficials and experts in regional countries allied and associated with the United States on the one hand have tended to welcome the recent US activism in regional groups and US public postures countering unilateral Chinese claims to territorial, resource, and

27、 navigation rights in nearby international waters. On the other hand, they are anxious about a possible escalation of tensions between the United States and China that might be hard to manage and could prove to be detrimental to their concerns about preserving regional stability. They look to the US

28、 to manage differences with China in ways that off-set perceived Chinese coercion and expansionism but avoid confrontation and tension.For now, many are preoccupied with what kind of reaction China will have in response to Secretary of State Clintons intervention regarding stability and navigation r

29、ights in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi in July, and to the presence of a US aircraft carrier and other advanced ships off the coast of Vietnam in celebration of a recent US-Vietnamese anniversary. They also question what plans the United States has to manage Chinas

30、 possible responses in ways that do not undermine regional stability.Meanwhile, many officials and nongovernment experts have strong concerns about the longer term future. They wonder whether the United States can sustain its military and economic commitments to the region. The global economic crisi

31、s and US recession have resulted in massive government debt that raises questions about future US military spending. The crisis and recession also challenge US free trade policies and the sustainability of the US asymmetrical trade relationships with Asia. China, for its part, seems positioned to co

32、ntinue economic, military, and political advances. Chinas military buildup has already raised serious questions about US ability to come to Taiwans defense in the event of a Chinese attack against the island. Chinese anti-access efforts might hamper US abilities to protect its interests in other are

33、as along the Chinese periphery.Challenges for the USSomewhat nervous allies and associates are likely to pose special challenges for US diplomacy. As the government deepens its involvement in sensitive regional issues, Asian friends and others will be watching carefully how well the US balances effo

34、rts to off-set Chinese unilateralism and intimidation while avoiding serious and disruptive confrontation or conflict. They also will be watching how well the US sustains its military leadership and open markets for Asian trade.US handling of sensitive issues like Taiwan are complicated as some frie

35、nds in the Asia-Pacific aver privately that Taiwans perceived gravitation into Chinas orbit, even with the acquiescence of the Taiwan administration, would make it more difficult for the US to reassure Japan, Australia, and other allies of its staying power as China rises. Many US friends and associ

36、ates want to know what will characterize the new Asian order and how they can best position their governments in the order. Since prevailing circumstances argue for considerable flux in the Asian order for some time to come, the United States likely will be called upon repeatedly to reassure, stabil

37、ize, and avoid actions seen as disruptive or confrontational.2. China in 2010: The Perils of Impatience by Denny RoyDenny Roy RoyDEastWestCenter.org is Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center.Against a background of recent Chinese behavior widely perceive

38、d as unusually assertive, Secretary of State Hillary Clintons policy speech in Hawaii on Oct. 28 reiterated the commitment of the United States, despite two ongoing wars and an economic downturn, to commit the resources and attention necessary to maintain US leadership in Asia for the long term. Thi

39、s points up a problem for the Chinese.The greatest single foreign-policy challenge for the government of a rising China is to balance two objectives that easily clash. The first is to build a reputation as a responsible, principled great power that will be a “force for peace” rather than a regional

40、bully. The second is to satisfy demands from the Chinese public and some Chinese elites that China begin to act like a strong country and stand up more strongly for what they see as Chinas interests.Beijing is very aware of the historical danger of neighboring countries banding together to “encircle

41、” a rising power and has expended great diplomatic energy to preclude this outcome. The Chinese are quick to condemn any talk of a “China threat” as a plot to suppress Chinas natural and rightful fulfillment of its potential, which includes bringing prosperity to Chinas huge population. Beijing ofte

42、n interprets US diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific as a plot to recruit allies in the “containment” of China.At the same time, however, Hu Jintaos government has urged Chinas people to feel pride in the international communitys recognition of China as a great power. This reflects well on Hus legacy as th

43、e country heads into a leadership transition, but it also emboldens nationalistic Chinese citizens as well as the military leadership to ask why China continues to tolerate those aspects of international affairs that China is unhappy about. This has required Chinese leaders to maintain a delicate ba

44、lance between patience and assertiveness. In 2010, Beijing has clearly lost its balance.Deng Xiaoping advised his successors to be restrained, to shelve difficult issues, and to avoid taking the lead in international affairs until China has consolidated its internal and external strength by completi

45、ng the present phase of economic and social development.This year, however, has seen a troubling pattern of strong Chinese reaction over issues Beijing prefers to keep on the back burner. The exposure of Chinas agenda to shield the North Korean regime from the effects of international opprobrium and

46、 economic sanctions after two nuclear weapons tests and the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan was disappointing enough. Chinas strident statements about planned US-South Korean naval exercises off the South Korean coast, which were aimed at North Korea rather than China, suggested the Chin

47、ese viewed the entire Yellow Sea as part of a sphere of influence in which foreign navies should be bound by Chinese wishes. When Clinton, after consultation with Southeast Asian governments, called for a collaborative multilateral approach to disputed territory in the South China Sea, PRC Foreign M

48、inister Yang Jiechi characterized her statement as “in effect an attack on China.”Chinese officials and retired generals have made remarks implying some form of Chinese ownership over most of the South China Sea, while the Chinese government refuses to clarify its claim beyond the infamous, breathta

49、kingly expansive “9-dashed line.” Chinese officials played hardball by cutting supplies of economically vital rare earth elements to Japan as a punishment for Japans detention of a Chinese fishing-boat captain who allegedly rammed Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the disputed Senkakku/Diaoyutai Isl

50、ands and this after Tokyo had released the captain.Outside analysts have some understanding of the pressures on the Chinese leadership. Public opinion has become a force to be reckoned with, and it tends to be exuberantly nationalistic. Anger over perceived affronts to Chinas national honor or encro

51、achments on vital Chinese interests (hot buttons that territorial disputes invariably push) often quickly turns to criticism of the Chinese government for failing to defend the countrys interests.Nevertheless, the Chinese leadership should not underestimate the costs of energizing “anti-China” force

52、s they so often criticize. Chinese acts that international opinion judges to be excessive undercut Beijings cultivation of a welcoming environment for Chinas rise. All indications are that Chinese leaders still worry about greatly about domestic problems such as tackling corruption, raising living s

53、tandards, re-building the social welfare system, balancing urban-rural and east-west development, and keeping a lid on social discontent. China is not prepared to embark on a campaign to revise the rules of regional interaction. Nor is it strong enough externally to shift from assurance to intimidat

54、ion. The United States remains the regions strongest military power. Several other important states are closely tied into a broad US-sponsored security agenda through alliances and US bases, and other states would quickly move toward greater security cooperation if they perceived China as threatenin

55、g.Many Chinese officials recognize their country has suffered strategic and diplomatic losses at least partly because of how China has reacted to regional events. It isnt clear whether the Chinese government can maintain a balanced foreign policy without succumbing to domestic pressures demanding ac

56、tions that even top policymakers recognize are strategically short-sighted.3. Tip of the Spear: the 13 Missions for US Marines in Okinawa by Tetsuo KotaniTetsuo Kotani (tetsuo.kotani) is a special research fellow at the Okazaki Institute in Tokyo. He is also a member of the Project 2049 Institute In

57、ternational Advisory Council, a senior research fellow at the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), and a Pacific Forum CSIS Nonresident SPF Fellow.Confusion over the Futenma Relocation Facility (FRF) damaged the US-Japan alliance and raised concerns among regional countries about the di

58、rection of the alliance. Before resigning from office, former Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio said he finally understood the role the Marine Corps play in providing deterrence and the need for marines to be on Okinawa.Throughout the mishandling of the FRF imbroglio, it was apparent that there was litt

59、le understanding in Japan of the role Marines play when called upon. They can storm beaches in classic amphibious fashion, defend Japanese territory in support of the Security Treaty, etc., and much more.Every marine is a riflemanRegardless of military occupational specialty, every marine is first a

60、nd foremost a disciplined warrior and part of a lean, versatile, flexible and ready force organized, trained, and equipped to operate from ships or to fight ashore as an air and ground combined armed force. This integrated force - known as the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) - consists of organ

61、ic air, ground and logistics elements under a single command element, and enables the MAGTF to conduct self-sustained operations autonomously or with other forces. The MAGTF is unique among militaries of the world in many aspects and is the key to Marine operations. It provides a balanced, combined-

62、arms force, which is scalable to meet the mission.One key aspect is the ease by which a MAGTF ashore, by either permissive or forcible means, can be increased in size, capability and capacity to meet a growing requirement or threat. It arrives, usually from the sea, with the required logistics to se

63、lf-sustain ashore for a period of time that increases with the size of the MAGTF. Whether involved in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, combat operations, or any other operation across the spectrum, the MAGTF is the worlds premiere emergency response force, and the presence of Marines in Japa

64、n is a testament to US dedication to security in the region.The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the smallest scale MAGTF, consisting of 1,500-3,000 Marines, and is forward-deployed around the world. The MEUs are characterized by their sea-based forward presence, expeditionary nature, ability to p

65、lan and respond to crises, and are combined arms, air- and ground-force capable. The 31st MEU is based in Okinawa, Japan, and the 11th, the 13th, and 15th MEUs are based in Camp Pendleton, California.The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is a rapidly deployable mid-sized MAGTF consisting of up to 20,000 Marines, and provides amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore for approximately 30 days.The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the largest MAGTF consisting of 20,000-90,000 Marines. The MEF is the principle Marine warfigh